Interpretivism without judgement-dependence

Philosophia 49 (2):611-615 (2021)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In a recent article in this journal, Krzysztof Poslajko reconstructs—and endorses as probative—a dilemma for interpretivism first posed by Alex Byrne. On the first horn of the dilemma, the interpretivist takes attitudes to emerge in relation to an ideal interpreter (and thus loses any connection with actual folk psychological practices). On the second horn, the interpretivist takes attitudes to emerge in relation to individuals’ judgements (and thus denies the possibility of error). I show that this is a false dilemma. By taking a model-theoretic approach to folk psychology, and marrying interpretivism with dispositionalism, interpretivists can viably reject the notion of an ideal (or canonical) interpreter—and relativize attitudes to actual lay interpreters—without taking on board the unacceptable epistemological consequences of allowing that attitudes are judgement-dependent.
Reprint years
2020, 2021
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CURIWJ
Upload history
First archival date: 2020-06-08
Latest version: 4 (2021-05-07)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-06-08

Total views
169 ( #31,575 of 2,433,548 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
85 ( #7,709 of 2,433,548 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.