A formação das regras de experiência na metodologia weberiana e sua adequação aos critérios de validação científicos

Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (2019)
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Abstract
This thesis studies the formation of rules of experience in Weberian methodology and its adequacy to scientific validation criteria. It was sought to investigate, in the first part of the work, a proposal of justification for the so-called eligibility criteria. It was also tried to explain the meaning used in this research of the term “reason”, which is based on the theoretical conception of the operative reason exposed by Newton da Costa. Again, with the help of the writings of the same author, we have examined those, so named by him, pragmatic principles of scientific reason. The second section of this study presented the three eligibility criteria, namely: i) the difference between to be (sein) and to ought to be (sollen); ii) the possibility of subsumption of individual action; iii) the construction of concepts as ideal types. In the third part of this work, rationally correct action was justified as an anticipated conjecture for a reflexive operation. However, it was supported that there is a significant difference in relation to the rules of experience when applied for the construction of the agent’s actions and in their use for validating the imputation of causal links between social phenomena. In order to validate the results of the research, the rules of experience must be cleverly designed to be general propositions of the experiment, and for this, the characterization of these rules was based in the so-called “Fermi solution”. Subsequent to this methodological proposal, we pondered how the scientist conducts a thought experiment in the empirical sciences of action and the judgment of objective possibility as a counterfactual proposition was logically structured. Thus, we tried to demonstrate the logical structure of the validation mode of knowledge produced in the empirical sciences of action from Weberian pattern.
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Archival date: 2019-05-18
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