Manipulation Arguments and Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In response to the increasingly popular manipulation argument against compatibilism, some have argued that libertarian accounts of free will are vulnerable to parallel manipulation arguments, and thus manipulation is not uniquely problematic for compatibilists. The main aim of this article is to give this point a more detailed development than it has previously received. Prior attempts to make this point have targeted particular libertarian accounts but cannot be generalized. By contrast, I provide an appropriately modified manipulation that targets all libertarian accounts of freedom and responsibility—an especially tricky task given that libertarian accounts are a motley set. I conclude that if manipulation arguments reveal any theoretical cost then it is one borne by all accounts according to which we are free and responsible, not by compatibilism in particular.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CYRMAA-3
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-02-13
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-02-13

Total views
385 ( #16,731 of 2,448,874 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
54 ( #11,530 of 2,448,874 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.