The Seeming Account of Self-Evidence: An Alternative to Audian Account

Logos and Episteme 9 (3):261-284 (2018)
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Abstract
In this paper, I argue against the epistemology of some contemporary moral intuitionists who believe that the notion of self-evidence is more important than that of intuition. Quite the contrary, I think the notion of intuition is more basic if intuitions are construed as intellectual seemings. First, I will start with elaborating Robert Audi’s account of self-evidence. Next, I criticise his account on the basis of the idea of “adequate understanding”. I shall then present my alternative account of self-evidence which is based on the seeming account of intuition. Finally, I show how the seeming account of self-evidence can make the moral intuitionist epistemology more tenable.
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2069-0533
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DABTSA
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First archival date: 2018-10-08
Latest version: 2 (2018-10-14)
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2018-10-08

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