Properties, Collections, and the Successive Addition Argument: A Reply to Malpass

Philosophia 51 (3):1-7 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The Successive Addition Argument (SAA) is one of the key arguments espoused by William Lane Craig for the thesis that the universe began to exist. Recently, Malpass, Mind, 131(523), 786–804 (2021) has developed a challenge to the SAA by way of constructing a counterexample that originates in the work of Fred Dretske. In this paper, I show that the Malpass-Dretske counterexample is in fact no counterexample to the argument. Utilizing a distinction between properties of members and properties of collections, I argue that Malpass’ counterexample has no bearing on the soundness of the SAA. I also develop a novel parity argument against Malpass’ argument that I demonstrate can only be resolved by way of the aforementioned analysis.

Author's Profile

Ibrahim Dagher
Yale University

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-12-24

Downloads
613 (#24,510)

6 months
201 (#12,081)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?