Explanatory pluralism in cognitive science

Cognitive Science 33 (2):739-742 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This brief commentary has three goals. The first is to argue that ‘‘framework debate’’ in cognitive science is unresolvable. The idea that one theory or framework can singly account for the vast complexity and variety of cognitive processes seems unlikely if not impossible. The second goal is a consequence of this: We should consider how the various theories on offer work together in diverse contexts of investigation. A final goal is to supply a brief review for readers who are compelled by these points to explore existing literature on the topic. Despite this literature, pluralism has garnered very little attention from broader cognitive science. We end by briefly considering what it might mean for theoretical cognitive science.

Author Profiles

Anthony Chemero
University of Cincinnati
Eric Dietrich
State University of New York at Binghamton

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-02-28

Downloads
752 (#9,714)

6 months
47 (#20,752)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?