In defence of error theory

Philosophical Studies 149 (2):209-230 (2010)
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Many contemporary philosophers rate error theories poorly. We identify the arguments these philosophers invoke, and expose their deficiencies. We thereby show that the prospects for error theory have been systematically underestimated. By undermining general arguments against all error theories, we leave it open whether any more particular arguments against particular error theories are more successful. The merits of error theories need to be settled on a case-by-case basis: there is no good general argument against error theories.

Author Profiles

David Liggins
University of Manchester
Chris Daly
University of Manchester


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