A Defence of Sexual Inclusion

Social Theory and Practice 46 (3):467-496 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This article argues that access to meaningful sexual experience should be included within the set of the goods that are subject to principles of distributive justice. It argues that some people are currently unjustly excluded from meaningful sexual experience and it is not implausible to suggest that they might thereby have certain claim rights to sexual inclusion. This does not entail that anyone has a right to sex with another person, but it does entail that duties may be imposed on society to foster greater sexual inclusion. This is a controversial thesis and this article addresses this controversy by engaging with four major objections to it: the misogyny objection; the impossibility objection; the stigmatisation objection; and the unjust social engineering objection.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DANADO-4
Upload history
First archival date: 2020-02-26
Latest version: 2 (2020-03-04)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-02-26

Total views
3,424 ( #711 of 2,439,691 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
376 ( #1,022 of 2,439,691 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.