Back to the Present: Defending Presentist Time Travel

Disputatio 4 (33):469 - 484 (2012)
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Here I defend the compatibility of presentism and time travel against a few objections. Keller and Nelson argue that, if presentism is at all plausible, presentism and time travel are as compatible as eternalism and time travel. But Miller and Sider are not convinced. I reply that for their concerns to have merit, Miller and Sider must assume presentists are committed to positions they need not be; I explain why presentists are not so committed and, in the process, defend Keller and Nelson’s position that there is no roadblock to presentist time travel that does not also apply to eternalist time travel.
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