Endurantism and Paradox

Philosophia 41 (4):1173-1179 (2013)
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Mereological challenges have recently been raised against the endurantist. For instance, Barker and Dowe (2003) have argued that eternalist endurantism entails (1) persisting objects are both 3D and 4D, and that (2) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. They also argue that presentist endurantism also entails, albeit in a tensed way, that (3) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. While they’ve further argued (2005) that the objections raised by McDaniel (2003) and Beebee and Rush (2003) fail, here I show that such objections are tenable without requiring further significant metaphysical commitments; I argue that such endurantist defences are tenable, contra to prior analyses
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Extended Simples.McDaniel, Kris
Are Shapes Intrinsic?Skow, Bradford

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Multilocation, Fusions and Confusions.Calosi, Claudio & Costa, Damiano

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