In Defence of the Epistemological Objection to Divine Command Theory

Sophia 58 (3):381-400 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Divine command theories come in several different forms but at their core all of these theories claim that certain moral statuses exist in virtue of the fact that God has commanded them to exist. Several authors argue that this core version of the DCT is vulnerable to an epistemological objection. According to this objection, DCT is deficient because certain groups of moral agents lack epistemic access to God’s commands. But there is confusion as to the precise nature and significance of this objection, and critiques of its key premises. In this article, I try to clear up this confusion and address these critiques. I do so in three ways. First, I offer a simplified general version of the objection. Second, I address the leading criticisms of the premises of this objection, focusing in particular on the role of moral risk/uncertainty in our understanding of God’s commands. And third, I outline four possible interpretations of the argument, each with a differing degree of significance for the proponent of the DCT.
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DANIDO-7
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-07-27
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-07-27

Total views
872 ( #3,786 of 51,672 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
139 ( #3,084 of 51,672 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.