Consistency of belief

Journal of Philosophy 68 (10):301-310 (1971)
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Abstract

A rational man’s beliefs are not logically consistent, and he does not believe all the logical consequences of his beliefs. This is because in any situational context, we only accept certain believed sentences. Within that context, we insist that sentences be logically consistent, and we accept the logical consequences of the other sentences we accept in that context. But such sentences do not have to be consistent with sentences we accept in other contexts, nor will we always accept in that context the logical consequences of sentences that we accept in other contexts. We go through many different situational contexts in the course of a day. For example, in trying to start a car with a dead battery, explaining why the car won’t start may form one context, while explaining how to start it may form a different context; sentences we accept in the first context may be logically inconsistent with sentences we accept in the second.

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Howard Darmstadter
Princeton University (PhD)

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