Comment on Searle: Philosophy and the Empirical Study of Consciousness

Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):320-333 (1993)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
I make three points about Searle’s philosophical work on consciousness and intentionality. First, I comment on Searle’s presentation and paper “The Problems of Consciousness.” I show that one of Searle’s philosophical claims about the relation between consciousness and intentionality appears to conflict with a demand he makes on acceptable empirical theories of the brain. Second, I argue that closer attention to the difference between conceptual connections and empirical connections corrects and improves Searle’s response to the so-called “Logical Connections” argument, the argument that claims that mental states cannot be causes, since they are conceptually connected with actions. Third, I give a formulation of his Chinese Room argument that avoids some tempting responses.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2012-10-08
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Computers.Piccinini, Gualtiero

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
245 ( #15,071 of 44,304 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #28,637 of 44,304 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.