Sensa in Sellars' theory of perception

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Abstract
Wilfrid Sellars claims that a scientific account of human beings will find it necessary to postulate a new type of basic particular, which he calls sensa. It is not entirely clear what are the reasons for which Sellars makes this claim. Sellars makes this claim. This thesis seeks to answer this question, and subsequently to evaluate what it finds to be Sellars' argument for sensa. Three possible arguments are distinguished. The argument from the homogeneity of colours ls taken to be Sellars' principal argument. A key premise this argument ls that colours, because of their ultimate homogeneity, cannot be reduced to complexes of scientific properties and relations. This premise involves a principle of reducibility which close scrutiny reveals to be more problematic than it initially appears. The conclusion ls that the argument for sensa fails because it relies on an unjustified application of the principle.
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1979
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Archival date: 2016-12-19
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2011-01-07

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