Rationalization, Evidence, and Pretense

Ratio 28 (3):318-331 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper I distinguish the category of “rationalization” from various forms of epistemic irrationality. I maintain that only if we model rationalizers as pretenders can we make sense of the rationalizer's distinctive relationship to the evidence in her possession. I contrast the cognitive attitude of the rationalizer with that of believers whose relationship to the evidence I describe as “waffling” or “intransigent”. In the final section of the paper, I compare the rationalizer to the Frankfurtian bullshitter
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DCRREA
Upload history
Archival date: 2014-09-29
View other versions
Added to PP index
2014-08-28

Total views
318 ( #19,314 of 2,439,471 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #42,577 of 2,439,471 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.