Episodic memory without autonoetic consciousness

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Ever since Tulving’s influential 1985 article “Memory and Consciousness” it has become traditional to think of autonoetic consciousness as necessary for episodic memory. This paper questions this claim. Specifically, it argues that the construct of autonoetic consciousness lacks validity and that, even if it was valid, it would still not be necessary for episodic memory. The paper ends with a proposal to go back to a functional/computational characterization of episodic memory in which its characteristic phenomenology is a contingent feature of the retrieval process and, as a result, open to empirical scrutiny. The proposal also dovetails with recent taxonomies of memory that are independent of conscious awareness and suggests strategies to evaluate within- and between-individual variability in the conscious experience of episodic memories in human and non-human agents.

Author's Profile

Felipe De Brigard
Duke University

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-07-23

Downloads
403 (#58,693)

6 months
403 (#3,190)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?