Religious Disagreement

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2019)
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Abstract
This Element examines what we can learn from religious disagreement, focusing on disagreement with possible selves and former selves, the epistemic significance of religious agreement, the problem of disagreements between religious experts, and the significance of philosophy of religion. Helen De Cruz shows how religious beliefs of others constitute significant higher-order evidence. At the same time, she advises that we should not necessarily become agnostic about all religious matters, because our cognitive background colors the way we evaluate evidence. This allows us to maintain religious beliefs in many cases, while nevertheless taking the religious beliefs of others seriously.
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2018, 2019
ISBN(s)
9781108457316
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DECRD-3
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Archival date: 2018-11-25
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References found in this work BETA
What Do Philosophers Believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
The Enigma of Reason.Sperber, Dan & Mercier, Hugo

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2018-07-09

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