Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):233-249 (2015)
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Abstract
Intuitions play a central role in analytic philosophy, but their psychological basis is little understood. This paper provides an empirically-informed, psychological char- acterization of philosophical intuitions. Drawing on McCauley’s distinction between maturational and practiced naturalness, I argue that philosophical intuitions originate from several early-developed, specialized domains of core knowledge (maturational naturalness). Eliciting and deploying such intuitions in argumentative contexts is the domain of philosophical expertise, thus philosophical intuitions are also practiced nat- ural. This characterization has implications for the evidential value of philosophical intuitions, as well as for the interpretation of studies in experimental philosophy.
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2015
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Archival date: 2014-10-11
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References found in this work BETA
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.Weinberg, Jonathan M.; Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen
Norms of Assertion.Lackey, Jennifer

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Citations of this work BETA
The Epistemic Value of Speculative Fiction.De Smedt, Johan & De Cruz, Helen
Must Philosophy Be Constrained? [REVIEW]Drożdżowicz, Anna; Saint-Germier, Pierre & Schindler, Samuel

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2014-10-11

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