Artificial Free Will: The Responsibility Strategy and Artificial Agents

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Abstract
Both a traditional notion of free will, present in human beings, and artificial intelligence are often argued to be inherently incompatible with determinism. Contrary to these criticisms, this paper defends that an account of free will compatible with determinism, the responsibility strategy (coined here) specifically, is a variety of free will worth wanting as well as a variety that is possible to (in principle) artificially construct. First, freedom will be defined and related to ethics. With that in mind, the two theses of free will are addressed (namely could have done otherwise and source origination) for both human beings and artificial agents.
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Archival date: 2018-10-08
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2016-03-30

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