Disagreement and Consensus in Science

In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. Routledge (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Consensus and disagreement play important roles in the practice, development, and dissemination of science. This raises a host of important philosophical questions. Some of these issues are conceptual: When, exactly, does a scientific agreement count as a consensus? And in what sense, if any, is disagreement the opposite of consensus? Other questions concern the role of consensus and disagreement in the development of science: For example, is consensus on central methodological issues and assumptions necessary for scientific work to proceed normally? Yet other questions are epistemological: From a layperson’s perspective, does the presence of a scientific consensus ever indicate that the relevant theory is probably correct? If so, what are the conditions under which it does so? Relatedly, should scientists themselves also defer to the consensus position among their peers whenever such a consensus exists? Or should they instead evaluate consensus theories for themselves, or even actively aim to dissent against such theories?

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Finnur Dellsén
University of Iceland

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