The epistemic impact of theorizing: generation bias implies evaluation bias

Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3661-3678 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
It is often argued that while biases routinely influence the generation of scientific theories, a subsequent rational evaluation of such theories will ensure that biases do not affect which theories are ultimately accepted. Against this line of thought, this paper shows that the existence of certain kinds of biases at the generation-stage implies the existence of biases at the evaluation-stage. The key argumentative move is to recognize that a scientist who comes up with a new theory about some phenomena has thereby gained an unusual type of evidence, viz. information about the space of theories that could be true of the phenomena. It follows that if there is bias in the generation of scientific theories in a given domain, then the rational evaluation of theories with reference to the total evidence in that domain will also be biased.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-12-02
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
303 ( #25,946 of 71,146 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #36,438 of 71,146 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.