The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement [Book Review]

Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):866-868 (2017)
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Abstract
Suppose you and I are equally well informed on some factual issue and equally competent in forming beliefs on the basis of the information we possess. Having evaluated this information, each of us independently forms a belief on the issue. However, since neither of us is infallible, we may end up with contrary beliefs. How should I react if I discover that we disagree in this way? According to conciliatory views in the epistemology of disagreement, I should modify my original opinion by moving closer to your opinion. According to steadfast views, I should not.In the past decade or so, this issue has been addressed in hundreds of journal articles and a number of edited collections. The literature...
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