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Abstract
There are two main approaches to the epistemology of science. On the one hand, some hold that a scientific hypothesis is confirmed to the extent that the hypothesis explains the evidence better than alternative hypotheses concerning the same subject-matter. This idea is often referred to as Inference to the Best Explanation. On the other hand, some hold that a scientific hypothesis is confirmed to the extent that the hypothesis is probable given the evidence. This idea is often associated with Bayesianism or Bayesian epistemology. There has been some controversy on whether and how these two approaches may be reconciled. This paper criticizes some recent attempts to make peace between Bayesianism and Inference to the Best Explanation and sketches a new account of how the two approaches may be reconciled.
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Archival date: 2016-02-18
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2016-02-18

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