John Mikhail on Moral Intuitions

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John Mikhail's moral psychology is an interestin contribution to philosophical debates surrounding the nature of normativity and moral and legal judgement. The paper focuses on Mikhail's metaethical assumptions and how they are combined with the Chomskian framework of his moral theory. Particularly the computational processes which are supposed to generate oughts will be scrutinised. It is then argued that--apart from three other issues--Mikhail does not provide a satisfactory answer to the is-ought problem.
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Archival date: 2014-08-26
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