The Facts and Practices of Moral Responsibility

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):790-811 (2019)
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Abstract
Strawsonians about moral responsibility often claim that our practices of holding morally responsible fix the facts of moral responsibility, rather than the other way round. Many have argued that such ‘reversal’ claims have an unwelcome consequence: If our practices of holding morally responsible fix the facts of moral responsibility, does this not imply, absurdly, that if we held severely mentally ill people responsible, they would be responsible? We provide a new Strawsonian answer to this question, and we explore the relation between reversal claims and (in)compatibilism.
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Archival date: 2020-04-02
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2019-09-29

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