The Facts and Practices of Moral Responsibility

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):790-811 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Strawsonians about moral responsibility often claim that our practices of holding morally responsible fix the facts of moral responsibility, rather than the other way round. Many have argued that such ‘reversal’ claims have an unwelcome consequence: If our practices of holding morally responsible fix the facts of moral responsibility, does this not imply, absurdly, that if we held severely mentally ill people responsible, they would be responsible? We provide a new Strawsonian answer to this question, and we explore the relation between reversal claims and (in)compatibilism.

Author Profiles

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-09-29

Downloads
425 (#37,180)

6 months
98 (#35,798)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?