‘Beyond A- and B-Time’ Reconsidered

Philosophia 38 (4):741-753 (2010)
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Abstract
This article is a response to Clifford Williams’s claim that the debate between A- and B theories of time is misconceived because these theories do not differ. I provide some missing support for Williams’s claim that the B-theory includes transition, by arguing that representative B-theoretic explanations for why we experience time as passing (even though it does not) are inherently unstable. I then argue that, contra Williams, it does not follow that there is nothing at stake in the A- versus B debate.
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Archival date: 2019-01-26
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References found in this work BETA
Temporal Experience.L. A. Paul - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (7):333-359.
Real Time Ii.Mellor, D. H.
The Ontology of Time.Oaklander, L. Nathan

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2010-06-09

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