Temporal experience and the A versus B debate

In Ian Phillips (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience: Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. New York: Routledge (2017)
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Abstract

This chapter discusses some aspects of the relation between temporal experience and the A versus B debate. To begin with, I provide an overview of the A versus B debate and, following Baron et al. (2015), distinguish between two B-theoretic responses to the A- theoretic argument from experience, veridicalism and illusionism. I then argue for veridicalism over illusionism, by examining our (putative) experiences as of presentness and as of time passing. I close with some remarks on the relation between veridicalism and a deflationary view of the A versus B debate. I suggest that the deflationary view can provide further support for veridicalism.

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Natalja Deng
Yonsei University

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