Affective intentionality and practical rationality

Dialectica 61 (3):311-322 (2007)
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‘Emotions are Janus-faced,’ writes de Sousa. ‘This suggests that we might speak of a truth, or perhaps two kinds of truth of emotions, one of which is about the self, and the other about conditions in the world’. Emotions, it is claimed, disclose facts about how the world is and about who we are. The articles in this volume all focus on one, the other, or both of these aspects of emotions – How do they contribute to provide reasons for judgements and actions? How do these judgements and actions, individual or collective, serve as occasions for interrogation and evaluation of the self or of morality?

Author Profiles

Ivo Wallimann-Helmer
Université de Fribourg
Christine Clavien
University of Geneva
Julien Deonna
University of Geneva


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