On the Humphrey Objection to Modal Realism

Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (2):159-179 (2018)
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An intuitive objection to modal realism is that merely possible worlds and their inhabitants seem to be irrelevant to an analysis of modality. Kripke originally phrased the objection in terms of being concerned about one’s modal properties without being concerned about the properties one’s other-worldly counterparts have. The author assesses this objection in a variety of forms, and then provides his own formulation that does not beg the question against the modal realist. Finally, the author considers two potential answers to the objection so understood and concludes that only one of them has a chance of succeeding.
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Causation.Lewis, David
Defining 'Intrinsic'.Langton, Rae & Lewis, David
Are Shapes Intrinsic?Skow, Bradford

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