Possible Worlds for Modal Primitivists

Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (1):109-131 (2014)
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Among the most remarkable developments in metaphysics since the 1950’s is the explosion of philosophical interest in possible worlds. This paper proposes an explanation of what possible worlds are, and argues that this proposal, the interpreted models conception, should be attractive to anyone who thinks that modal facts are primitive, and so not to be explained in terms of some non-modal notion of “possible world.” I articulate three constraints on any acceptable primitivist explanation of the nature of possible worlds, and show that the interpreted models conception meets the three constraints.
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Naming and Necessity.Kripke, Saul A.
Assertion.Stalnaker, Robert

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Modal Objectivity.Justin, Clarke-Doane
Modal Objectivity1.Clarke‐Doane, Justin

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