Non-conceptual content or Singular Concept?

Kaant Studien Online 1:210-239 (2014)
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This paper is a new non-descriptivist defense of nonconceptualism based on a new interpretation of Kant’s metaphysics of concepts. We advance the following claim: What distinguishes non-conceptual from conceptual singular representations is the way partial representations of the object’s features are integrated into the whole representation of the object, while at the non-conceptual level, this integration takes the form of images of the object’s features that are stored and projected, at the conceptual level this integration takes the form of the recognition that those features are properties of a same object, what Kant calls “synthetic unity of Aperception”

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Roberto Horácio De Pereira
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro


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