Emotional Phenomenology: Toward a Nonreductive Analysis

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):27-40 (2017)
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Abstract

In this article I want to create a presumption in favor of a nonreductive analysis of emotional phenomenology. The presumption relies on the claim that none of the nonemotional elements which are usually regarded as constitutive of emotional phenomenology may reasonably be considered responsible for the evaluative character of the latter. In section 1 I suggest this is true of cognitive elements, arguing that so-called ‘evaluative’ judgments usually result from emotional, evaluative attitudes, and should not be conflated with them. In section 2 I argue the same holds true for conative attitudes. And in section 3 I briefly mention some salient aspects of the version of nonreductive analysis I lean toward.

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Arnaud Dewalque
University of Liège

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