¿Son a priori los modelos explicativos de la selección natural?

Metatheoria – Revista de Filosofía E Historia de la Ciencia 8:31--42 (2017)
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The epistemic status of Natural Selection has intrigued to biologists and philosophers since the very beginning of the theory to our present times. One prominent contemporary example is Elliott Sober, who claims that Natural Selection, and some other theories in biology, and maybe in economics, are peculiar in including explanatory models/conditionals that are a priori in a sense in which explanatory models/conditionals in Classical Mechanics and most other standard theories are not. In this paper, by analyzing what we take to be the four possible interpretations of Sober’s claim, we argue that, terminological preferences aside, the possible senses in which explanatory models in Natural Selection can qualify, or include elements that can qualify, as a priori, also apply to Classical Mechanics and other standard, highly unified theories.

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Pablo Lorenzano
Universidad Nacional de Quilmes


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