Plausibility and Probability in Juridical Proof

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This note discusses three issues that Allen and Pardo believe to be especially problematic for a probabilistic interpretation of standards of proof: (1) the subjectivity of probability assignments; (2) the conjunction paradox; and (3) the non-comparative nature of probabilistic standards. I offer a reading of probabilistic standards that avoids these criticisms.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DIBPAP
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-01-22
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2019-01-22

Total views
28 ( #32,971 of 38,049 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
28 ( #13,602 of 38,049 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.