Plausibility and Reasonable Doubt in the Simonshaven Case

Topics in Cognitive Science 12 (4):1200-1204 (2020)
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Abstract

I comment on two analyses of the Simonshaven case: one by Prakken (2019), based on arguments, and the other by van Koppen and Mackor (2019), based on scenarios (or stories, narratives). I argue that both analyses lack a clear account of proof beyond a reasonable doubt because they lack a clear account of the notion of plausibility. To illustrate this point, I focus on the defense argument during the appeal trial and show that both analyses face difficulties in modeling key features of this argument.

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Marcello Di Bello
Arizona State University

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