Judgment aggregation: (Im)possibility theorems

Journal of Economic Theory 1 (126):286-298 (2006)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The aggregation of individual judgments over interrelated propositions is a newly arising field of social choice theory. I introduce several independence conditions on judgment aggregation rules, each of which protects against a specific type of manipulation by agenda setters or voters. I derive impossibility theorems whereby these independence conditions are incompatible with certain minimal requirements. Unlike earlier impossibility results, the main result here holds for any (non-trivial) agenda. However, independence conditions arguably undermine the logical structure of judgment aggregation. I therefore suggest restricting independence to premises, which leads to a generalised premise-based procedure. This procedure is proven to be possible if the premises are logically independent.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DIEJAI
Upload history
First archival date: 2020-04-13
Latest version: 2 (2020-04-24)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
71 ( #50,334 of 2,448,700 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #39,598 of 2,448,700 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.