Judgment aggregation without full rationality

Social Choice and Welfare 31:15-39 (2008)
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Abstract
Several recent results on the aggregation of judgments over logically connected propositions show that, under certain conditions, dictatorships are the only propositionwise aggregation functions generating fully rational (i.e., complete and consistent) collective judgments. A frequently mentioned route to avoid dictatorships is to allow incomplete collective judgments. We show that this route does not lead very far: we obtain oligarchies rather than dictatorships if instead of full rationality we merely require that collective judgments be deductively closed, arguably a minimal condition of rationality, compatible even with empty judgment sets. We derive several characterizations of oligarchies and provide illustrative applications to Arrowian preference aggregation and Kasher and Rubinsteinís group identification problem.
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References found in this work BETA
On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions.Alchourrón, Carlos E.; Gärdenfors, Peter & Makinson, David
Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation.Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian
Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation.Pauly, Marc & van Hees, Martin

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Citations of this work BETA
Judgment Aggregation: A Survey.List, Christian & Puppe, Clemens

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2009-01-28

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