Reassessing Epistemic Foundations: The Case for Justified Probable Belief


Abstract: This paper endeavors to establish a comprehensive account of human knowledge that embraces the probabilistic nature of truth, the integral role of language in our cognitive processes, and the uncertainty and fallibility inherent in our cognitive systems. Drawing upon the work of various philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, the paper advocates for a reinterpretation of the traditional "Justified True Belief" as "Justified Probable Belief." Additionally, the biological underpinnings of this perspective are explored, with an emphasis on synaptic plasticity, dopamine-based learning, and epigenetic mechanisms.


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