The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications

Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2):603-638 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The new …eld of judgment aggregation aims to …nd collective judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that, fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions like “if a then b” are adequately modelled, namely as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and complete collective judgments can be reached through appropriate quota rules (which decide propositions using acceptance thresholds). I characterise the class of these quota rules. I also prove an abstract result that characterises consistent aggregation for arbitrary agendas in a general logic.

Author's Profile

Franz Dietrich
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
249 (#59,116)

6 months
91 (#41,865)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?