Eight Arguments against Double Effect

In Proceedings of the XXIII. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I offer eight arguments against the Doctrine of Double Effect, a normative principle according to which in pursuing the good it is sometimes morally permissible to bring about some evil as a side-effect or merely foreseen consequence: the same evil would not be morally justified as an intended means or end.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DINEAA
Upload history
Archival date: 2014-08-01
View other versions
Added to PP index
2014-08-01

Total views
394 ( #16,315 of 2,448,775 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
53 ( #11,799 of 2,448,775 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.