Ratio 34 (3):203-216 (
2021)
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Abstract
While many have argued that moral disagreement poses
a challenge to moral knowledge, the precise nature of this
challenge is controversial. Indeed, in the moral epistemology
literature, there are many different versions of ‘the’ argument
from moral disagreement to moral scepticism. This
paper contributes to this vast literature on moral disagreement
by arguing for two theses: 1. All (or nearly all) moral
disagreement arguments share an underlying structure; and,
2. All moral disagreement arguments that satisfy this underlying
structure cannot establish moral scepticism because
this underlying structure leads to a previously unrecognized
reductio ad absurdum. In short, I argue that this reductio argument
(very likely) refutes all versions of the moral disagreement
to moral scepticism argument in one fell swoop.