Hume on Knowledge of Metaphysical Modalities

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I outline Hume’s views about conceivability evidence. Then I critically scrutinize two threats to conceivability-based modal epistemology. Both arise from Hume’s criticism of claims to knowing necessary causal relationships: Firstly, a sceptical stance towards causal necessity may carry over to necessity claims in general. Secondly, since – according to a sceptical realist reading – Hume grants the eventuality of causal powers grounded in essential features of objects, conceivability-based claims to comprehensive metaphysical possibilities seem endangered. I argue that although normal conceivability-based claims are defeasible, they are prima facie vindicated.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DOHHOK
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-26
View other versions
Added to PP index
2015-02-06

Total views
345 ( #20,213 of 65,697 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
83 ( #8,507 of 65,697 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.