Hume on Knowledge of Metaphysical Modalities

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I outline Hume’s views about conceivability evidence. Then I critically scrutinize two threats to conceivability-based modal epistemology. Both arise from Hume’s criticism of claims to knowing necessary causal relationships: Firstly, a sceptical stance towards causal necessity may carry over to necessity claims in general. Secondly, since – according to a sceptical realist reading – Hume grants the eventuality of causal powers grounded in essential features of objects, conceivability-based claims to comprehensive metaphysical possibilities seem endangered. I argue that although normal conceivability-based claims are defeasible, they are prima facie vindicated.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DOHHOK
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-26
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-02-06

Total views
116 ( #24,018 of 42,390 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #25,960 of 42,390 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.