Ethical Pragmatism

Metaphilosophy 48 (4):383-403 (2017)
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Beginning with a thought experiment about a mysterious Delphic oracle, this article motivates, explains, and attempts to defend a view it calls Ethical Pragmatism. Ethical Pragmatism is the view that we can and should carry on our practice of moral deliberation without reference to moral truths, or more broadly, without reference to metaethics. The defense the article mounts tries to show that neither suspicions about the tenability of fact-value distinctions, nor doubts about the viability of global pragmatism, nor worries about the “force” of ethical injunctions without reference to moral truths constitute good reason to reject Ethical Pragmatism.
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The Sources of Normativity.Korsgaard, Christine M.
Moral Realism: A Defence.Shafer-Landau, Russ

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The Nihilist.Donelson, Raff

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