Ethical Pragmatism

Metaphilosophy 48 (4):383-403 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Beginning with a thought experiment about a mysterious Delphic oracle, this article motivates, explains, and attempts to defend a view it calls Ethical Pragmatism. Ethical Pragmatism is the view that we can and should carry on our practice of moral deliberation without reference to moral truths, or more broadly, without reference to metaethics. The defense the article mounts tries to show that neither suspicions about the tenability of fact-value distinctions, nor doubts about the viability of global pragmatism, nor worries about the “force” of ethical injunctions without reference to moral truths constitute good reason to reject Ethical Pragmatism.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DONEP
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-07-13
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-07-21

Total views
401 ( #15,998 of 2,448,699 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
218 ( #2,226 of 2,448,699 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.