If There Are No Diachronic Norms of Rationality, Why Does It Seem Like There Are?

Res Philosophica 96 (2):141-173 (2019)
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I offer an explanation for why certain sequences of decisions strike us as irrational while others do not. I argue that we have a standing desire to tell flattering yet plausible narratives about ourselves, and that cases of diachronic behavior that strike us as irrational are those in which you had the opportunity to hide something unflattering and failed to do so.
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First archival date: 2019-05-03
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