Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Assume that it is your evidence that determines what opinions you should have. I argue that since you should take peer disagreement seriously, evidence must have two features. (1) It must sometimes warrant being modest: uncertain what your evidence warrants, and (thus) uncertain whether you’re rational. (2) But it must always warrant being guided: disposed to treat your evidence as a guide. Surprisingly, it is very difficult to vindicate both (1) and (2). But diagnosing why this is so leads to a proposal—Trust—that is weak enough to allow modesty but strong enough to yield many guiding features. In fact, I claim that Trust is the Goldilocks principle—for it is necessary and sufficient to vindicate the claim that you should always prefer to use free evidence. Upshot: Trust lays the foundations for a theory of disagreement and, more generally, an epistemology that permits self-doubt—a modest epistemology.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DOREAG
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-10-04
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

View all 78 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Don’T Look Now.Salow, Bernhard & Ahmed, Arif

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-10-04

Total views
569 ( #4,292 of 40,145 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
185 ( #1,937 of 40,145 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.