How vagueness could cut out at any order

Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):1-10 (2015)
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Abstract
Timothy Williamson has shown that the B axiom for 'definitely' (α → Δ¬Δ¬α) guarantees that if a sentence is second-order vague in a Kripke model, it is nth order vague for every n. More recently, Anna Mahtani has argued that Williamson's epistemicist theory of vagueness does not support the B axiom, and conjectured that if we consider models in which the “radius of accessibility” varies between different points, we will be able to find sentences that are nth-order vague but (n+1)th-order precise, for any n. This paper bolsters Mahtani's argument, shows her conjecture to be true, and shows that imposing certain further natural constraints on "variable radius" models does not change the situation.
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2015
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Archival date: 2014-05-26
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Vagueness.Torrago, Loretta
Identity and Discrimination.Schwartz, Stephen P.

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Citations of this work BETA
Very Improbable Knowing.Williamson, Timothy

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