A conception of genetic parenthood

Bioethics 33 (1):54-59 (2018)
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We seek to develop a plausible conception of genetic parenthood, taking a recent discussion by Heidi Mertes as our point of departure. Mertes considers two conceptions of genetic parenthood—one invoking genetic resemblance, and the other genetic inheritance—and presents counter-examples to both conceptions. We revise Mertes’ second conception so as to avoid these and related counter-examples.

Author Profiles

Katrien Devolder
Oxford University
Thomas Douglas
Oxford University


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