Agent-neutral deontology

Philosophical Studies 163 (2):527-537 (2013)
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Abstract
According to the “Textbook View,” there is an extensional dispute between consequentialists and deontologists, in virtue of the fact that only the latter defend “agent-relative” principles—principles that require an agent to have a special concern with making sure that she does not perform certain types of action. I argue that, contra the Textbook View, there are agent-neutral versions of deontology. I also argue that there need be no extensional disagreement between the deontologist and consequentialist, as characterized by the Textbook View
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Archival date: 2013-12-08
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Modern Moral Philosophy.Anscombe, G. E. M.

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