A puzzle about Moorean metaphysics

Philosophical Studies 178 (2):493-513 (2021)
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Abstract

Some metaphysicians believe that existence debates are easily resolved by trivial inferences from Moorean premises. This paper considers how the introduction of negative Moorean facts—negative existentials that command Moorean certainty—complicates this picture. In particular, it shows how such facts, when combined with certain plausible metaontological principles, generate a puzzle that commits the proponents of this method to a contradiction.

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Louis Doulas
University of California, Irvine

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