Enhancement & Desert

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It is sometimes claimed that those who succeed with the aid of enhancement technologies deserve the rewards associated with their success less, other things being equal, than those who succeed without the aid of such technologies. This claim captures some widely held intuitions, has been implicitly endorsed by participants in social-psychological research, and helps to undergird some otherwise puzzling philosophical objections to the use of enhancement technologies. I consider whether it can be provided with a rational basis. I examine three arguments that might be offered in its favor and argue that each either shows only that enhancements undermine desert in special circumstances, or succeeds only under assumptions that deprive the appeal to desert of much of its dialectic interest.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DOUED-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-10-16
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-10-16

Total views
261 ( #20,793 of 57,106 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
58 ( #12,272 of 57,106 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.